In the speakers' bureau system, physicians are recruited and trained by pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and medical device companies to deliver information about products to other physicians, in exchange for a fee. Using publicly available disclosures, we assessed the thesis that speakers' bureau involvement is not a feature of academic medicine in Canada, by estimating the prevalence of participation in speakers' bureaus among Canadian faculty in one medical specialty, cardiology. We analyzed the relevant features of an actual contract made public by the physician addressee and applied the Canadian Medical Association (CMA) guidelines on physician-industry relations to participation in a speakers' bureau. We argue that speakers' bureau participation constitutes a form of peer selling that should be understood to contravene the prohibition on product endorsement in the CMA Code of Ethics. Academic medical institutions, in conjunction with regulatory colleges, should continue and strengthen their policies to address participation in speakers' bureaus. about emerging drugs and devices, but the time pressures of clinical practice may limit their ability to do so independently. The companies that manufacture and sell these products have the resources and the motivation to "educate" physicians but cannot be expected to distinguish their marketing goals from physicians' educational needs. Physicians' professional associations and regulatory bodies, as well as medical journal publishers and editors, drug and device regulatory agencies, and academic medical institutions, have long debated their respective roles and responsibilities in ensuring the safety, efficacy, and probity of prescribing in light of these pressures and interests.
➣ Physicians need to stay abreast of information about emerging drugs and devices, but the time pressures of clinical practice may limit their ability to do so independently. The companies that manufacture and sell these products have the resources and the motivation to "educate" physicians but cannot be expected to distinguish their marketing goals from physicians' educational needs. Physicians' professional associations and regulatory bodies, as well as medical journal publishers and editors, drug and device regulatory agencies, and academic medical institutions, have long debated their respective roles and responsibilities in ensuring the safety, efficacy, and probity of prescribing in light of these pressures and interests. 1 One current context of this long-standing struggle is the "speakers' bureau" system, in which pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and medical device companies recruit and train physicians to deliver information about products to other physicians, in exchange for a fee or other considerations, such as professional development opportunities. 2 Participants in the system argue that physicians are best situated to deliver accurate information about new drugs and devices to other physicians and that industry is best placed to fund such communication. Critics reply that the speakers' bureau system raises significant concerns about ethics and professionalism and that it is part of a complex system of drug promotion 3, 4 and relationship-building with physicians [5] [6] [7] that contributes to irrational prescribing, 8 inflated health care costs, 2 and even harm to patients or society more generally. Some steps have been taken toward limiting participation in speakers' bureaus. The American Association of Medical Colleges (AAMC), in a report endorsed by the Association of Faculties of Medicine of Canada (AFMC), 9 has stated that faculty participation in speakers' bureaus should be strongly discouraged and that faculty, residents, and students should be prohibited from attending such events. 10 Furthermore, in the United States, lawsuit settlements and health care reform (i.e., the Physician Payment Sunshine Act, passed as a part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 11 ) are bringing some transparency to speakers' bureau arrangements. 12, 13 
Prevalence of participation in speakers' bureaus
Industry seeks the aid of academic physicians to communicate its message to other physicians because these opinion leaders influence the prescribing behaviour of their peers.
14 In a 2003-2004 survey of US physicians, 16% of respondents reported receiving payment for participation in speakers' bureaus. 15 Cardiologists were more than twice as likely as family practitioners, and significantly more likely than certain other specialty physicians, to receive payments, including both speakers' bureau fees and other honoraria. In a 2007 survey of life sciences departments in the 50 US universities receiving the highest levels of funding from the National Institutes of Health, 23.8% of respondents reported being a "paid speaker" for industry, which ranked behind "consultant" (about 32%) as the second most common type of relationship with industry. 16 These paid speakers were more likely to be from clinical departments, to be at the rank of full professor, and to produce more publications than those who were not paid speakers, which suggests that those participating in the speakers' bureau system are well positioned to influence others. We are aware of no similar survey data for Canada, although a recent study suggested that financial conflicts of interest arising from relationships with industry are more common among authors of clinical practice guidelines in Canada than in the United States. 17 For
Canada, we found that 1 or more of the top 5 publishing cardiologists at each of 12 out of 13 Canadian medical schools had disclosed receipt of "lecture fees" or a "speaker's honorarium," had been "paid to speak for," and/or had participated on a speakers' bureau on one or more occasions (median 2 out of 5 faculty members) (see Figure 1 and online Appendix A for details).
Ethical and professional considerations
Participation in a speakers' bureau involves 4 essential elements pertaining to control over the content to be delivered by the speaker and to the consideration upon which the agreement is contingent (Box 1). According to the conventions of contract law, the elements of any agreement may be explicit or implicit, but both parties must receive consideration in order for the contract to be binding.
As an example, a Schering-Plough speakers' bureau agreement made public by Dr. Daniel Carlat 18 followed this contract law convention, with both explicit and implicit terms and consideration going to each party (see Box 1 and Table 1 ). With respect to content, the contract explicitly specified that the company would provide mandatory training and would supply educational materials to which the physician had to adhere: the (1) participants in a speakers' bureau, defined as those who disclosed receipt of "lecture fees" or a "speaker's honorarium" from, being "paid to speak for" by, or participating on a "speakers' bureau" sponsored by one or more pharmaceutical companies; (2) those disclosing receipt of "honoraria" only, as opposed to specific disclosure of lecture fees, a speaker's honorarium, or similar fees; (3) those disclosing no participation in a speakers' bureau or receipt of honoraria. The methods for this analysis are described in more detail in Appendix A. by the American Medical Association's Code of Medical Ethics. 22 Historically, Canadian physicians have been disciplined in the courts for the endorsement of products to the public. 23, 24 In 2007, however, the CMA adopted a policy entitled "Guidelines for Physicians in Interactions with Industry," 25 which states unequivocally that the prohibition on product endorsement extends beyond communication by physicians to the public to include communication among physicians:
Peer selling occurs when a pharmaceutical or medical device manufacturer or service provider engages a physician to conduct a seminar or similar event that focuses on its own products and is designed to enhance the sale of those products. This also applies to third party contracting on behalf of industry. This form of participation would reasonably be seen as being in contravention of the CMA's Code of Ethics, which prohibits endorsement of a specific product.
intellectual content of the presentation was therefore almost entirely in the hands of the company. With regard to consideration, only the speaker's fee was explicit in the contract, but whether the physician would continue to serve on the speakers' bureau was entirely at the company's discretion. The implied term of the agreement was, therefore, that the speaker's performances must be in keeping with the company's interests and objectives-presumably, reputation, image, and, ultimately, sales. Indeed, industry "reps" often attend speakers' bureau events to build relationships with attending physicians, and industry tracks prescriptions of the product by attendees before and after the event. 2, 5, 19 In its Code of Ethics, 20 the Canadian Medical Association (CMA) has continuously prohibited product endorsements by physicians. 21 In the United States, by contrast, physician product endorsement-apart from in-office sales with direct returns-is not addressed • Respond only to the specifi c question, on basis of "scientifi c and clinical expertise"
• Disclose that information is not part of the approved product labelling Speakers' bureau activities fall squarely within this definition of peer selling and hence product endorsement. Determining whether an event is designed to enhance sales involves considering both the explicit and the implicit terms of the contract. Attendance of company representatives at speakers' bureau events and the monitoring of sales 2, 5, 19 after presentations make enhanced sales an implied term of the arrangement. Any participation by the same physician in events designed to enhance the sale of competitors' products is irrelevant to the question of whether a given act constitutes marketing. By the same token, becoming a member of multiple speakers' bureaus does not confer greater objectivity upon a physician's participation. 2 Participation in a speakers' bureau is within the ambit of peer selling and should be the target of regulatory attention. The CMA's prohibition on product endorsement by physicians is not enough. In the United States, where physicians are permitted to act as marketers, there is considerable movement toward regulatory oversight. Regulatory response to the practice remains weak in Canada.
Challenges to enforcement
The Canadian medical profession, its regulatory colleges, continuing medical education (CME) accreditation bodies, and academic medical centres all have critical roles to play in bringing an end to peer selling, but thus far, each has struggled to do so.
Although provincial regulatory colleges are well placed to regulate speakers' bureau participation by adopting the CMA's 2007 guidelines on physicianindustry relations, 25 uptake among colleges varies (see Table 2 ), and we found no record of any enforcement in published disciplinary proceedings. This is not surprising, given that college discipline is largely driven by complaints from the public, and speakers' bureau activities, taking place within the profession, are unlikely to come to the public's attention. Furthermore, physicians are generally reluctant to report their colleagues, 33, 34 and this may be particularly true when it comes to reporting prevalent and lucrative activities of influential members of the profession.
Bodies that accredit and, in some cases, develop CME in Canada also have a role to play in addressing speakers' bureau participation. Such bodies consist of CME committees of national specialty societies, CME offices of faculties of medicine, and maintenance-ofcertification programs of the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada and the College of Family Physicians of Canada. We reviewed the posted policies and statements of the AFMC's Committee on Accreditation of Continuing Medical Education and Standing Committee on Continuing Professional Development (representing CME offices of faculties of medicine), the Royal College, the College of Family Physicians of Canada, and the Conseil de l'éducation médicale continue du Québec for their adoption of the CMA guidelines (see Table 3 ). We found that the CMA guidelines are widely endorsed. Furthermore, the Standing Committee on Continuing Professional Development has endorsed the AAMC recommendation that faculties of medicine should discourage speakers' bureau participation among their faculty. 36 Naturally, CME bodies cannot directly prohibit or limit speakers' bureau activities: given prohibitions on direct payment from industry to faculty in accredited CME, speakers' bureau activities fall, by definition, outside of accredited CME. However, CME accrediting bodies may prohibit or control speakers' bureau participants acting as faculty in CME, and these bodies do play an essential role in defining and maintaining the distinction between marketing and education that speakers' bureau activities blur. Box 2 lists the approaches that CME bodies can take to achieve these goals, derived from guidelines of the CMA, 25 the US Accreditation Council for Continuing Medical Education, 41 the Standing Committee on Continuing Professional Development of the AFMC, 36 and the AAMC. 10, 42 Assessing the extent to which Canadian CME bodies have availed themselves of all these mechanisms is beyond the scope of this paper. However, we raise questions about two aspects of the approaches of Canadian CME bodies that pertain to the fundamental distinction between marketing and education. The CMA guidelines prohibit industry membership on CME scientific planning committees; in the United States, the Accreditation Council for Continuing Medical Education more broadly prohibits any industry influence on content, whether direct or indirect. 43 In contrast, the Conseil de l'éducation médicale continue du Québec, in partnership with industry, has crafted its own code of ethics for CME. 32 ). The Conseil de l'éducation médicale continue du Québec thus appears to maintain a standard requiring industry involvement, one that Rx&D itself abandoned in its 2012 code. 38 The Royal
College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada, by referencing the code authored by the Conseil de l'éducation médicale continue du Québec and Rx&D (see Table 3 ), appears to endorse this approach. By contrast, the College of Family Physicians of Canada cites the Rx&D code but gives the CMA guidelines priority, whereas the Committee on Accreditation of Continuing Medical
Education and the Standing Committee on Continuing Professional Development of the AFMC indicate that the CMA guidelines should represent the minimum acceptable standard. Whether Canadian CME accrediting bodies tolerate "direct or indirect" influence in the form of a CME scientific planning committee seeking input Mechanisms for clarifying CME as credible alternative to speakers' bureau events ➣ Requiring arms-length arrangements for industry funding of CME programs and offi ces ➣ Limiting or prohibiting industry infl uence on CME content ➣ Limiting or prohibiting industry attendance or exhibition at educational events ➣ Applying educational rather than advertising standards to CME content ➣ Setting standards prohibiting ghost authorship of CME materials; requiring disclosure of co-authorship and forbidding (or requiring disclosure of ) industry funding of or employees acting as co-authors
Mechanisms for controlling participants in speakers' bureaus in terms of acting as CME faculty ➣ Forbidding direct industry payment to CME faculty for their CME teaching ➣ Requiring disclosure from CME faculty and scientifi c committee members of their non-CME speakers' bureau activities; preferentially recruiting non-speakers' bureau participants to CME faculty and scientifi c committees; prohibiting speakers' bureau participants from roles with CME faculty and scientifi c committees CME = continuing medical education. Guidelines developed in collaboration with industry (Rx&D) posted CME = continuing medical education, Rx&D = Canada's Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies. * Not including individual CME offi ces of faculties of medicine and of national specialty societies. † Including prohibition on participation in speakers' bureaus.
or approval from industry appears to be an open question, or even a requirement in CME in Quebec, which raises significant questions about the independence of accredited CME.
Furthermore, CME regulation and guidelines typically rely on several markers for distinguishing scientific and educational activities from marketing. For example, in both the United States and Canada, guidelines may refer to "satellite symposia" as well-known venues for industry-funded activities that resemble but must be distinguished from concurrent independent scientific meetings. A marker relevant to speakers' bureaus used in the United States is the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) restriction on marketing for off-label indications. As a matter of law, the FDA and Health Canada do not regulate the practice of medicine or the free speech of educators and scientists; rather, they regulate the sale of medical products. Thus, the presence of a responsibility to adhere to FDA-approved indications is one clear signal that a presenter is acting as a marketer rather than an educator under US policy. 2, 10 The 2012 Rx&D code, 38 however, states that materials that Rx&D member companies create or assist in creating for faculty who intend to use the materials in accredited CME must conform to the requirements set by the Pharmaceutical Advertising Advisory Board and the Advertising Standards Council-entities established to regulate advertising, not educational and scientific activities. CME bodies that adopt the Rx&D code 38 alongside the CMA guidelines 25 effectively adopt this same restriction. Prohibiting marketing materials in CME from violating marketing laws is very different from prohibiting marketing materials from being presented in CME at all. Ironically, then, through adoption of the Rx&D guidelines alongside the CMA guidelines, Canadian physicians may come to see adopting marketing restrictions on materials they present as their ethical responsibility as educators, rather than a sign that they have taken on the role of marketers. Clarity around communication about off-label uses is particularly important in the context of speakers' bureaus, as industry may employ physicians as speakers precisely to skirt (in a limited and perhaps legally defensible fashion) regulators' prohibitions related to promoting off-label uses of products. In the ScheringPlough contract, 18 for example, a signatory would agree not to present off-label uses in industry-prepared materials, but would enjoy permission to discuss off-label uses based on clinical experience, after or in addition to the formal presentation, and this is more than company sales representatives may do. [2] [3] [4] 45 Again, a signatory to a speakers' bureau agreement may mistakenly understand standards for ethical marketing (an indication that the physician is now engaged in marketing) as standards for ethical education. CME accreditors, following the example of the AAMC, should abandon misguided attempts to partner with industry in defining ethical standards for continuing education. CME accreditors are uniquely responsible for setting clear and credible standards that distinguish education from marketing. Given their leadership role within academic medical centres, Canadian CME accreditors should also take steps to prohibit or discourage speakers' bureau participants from acting as faculty in accredited CME, or to control any such activity.
Academic medical centres are well placed to take action on participation in speakers' bureaus, as most speakers are academics, 13 and Canadian centres have formal ethical standards that apply in all teaching, whether in accredited CME or non-accredited events. The AFMC has endorsed the AAMC's Industry Funding of Medical Education report, 9 which recommends that faculties forbid (or, if they do not forbid, then discourage and regulate) physicians' involvement in speakers' if permitted, then discourage and set standards, including those listed below ➣ Forbid use of university logo or affi liation in speakers' bureau activities ➣ Forbid attendance by faculty and trainees at speakers' bureau events ➣ If attendance is allowed, forbid acceptance by faculty and trainees of meals and other gifts at speakers' bureau events ➣ Require disclosure of speakers' bureau activities (among other industry relations) in standard disclosures (for teaching, presenting, publishing) ➣ Forbid receipt of payment beyond fair market value ➣ Set standards (prohibiting ghostwriting and requiring authorship credit for all collaborators and disclosure of fi nancial arrangements) for industry involvement in preparation of educational materials used in continuing medical education and across the educational continuum ➣ Require disclosure of speakers' bureau activities (among other industry relations) within the institution and to the public bureaus (see Box 3 for key recommendations 
Conclusion
When the content of a physician's presentation to any audience of physicians or other health care providers does not rest exclusively in the hands of the speaker and she or he understands-whether through an explicit term of a contract or an implied agreement-that the goal of the presentation is to increase uptake of a particular health care product, the physician is violating the CMA's guideline against peer selling and the prohibition on product endorsement in the CMA's Code of Ethics. Although physician participation in promotional activities within the profession appears to be common, at least in some specialties, there is no record of disciplinary action in relation to this practice, even in provinces where regulatory colleges have adopted the CMA's prohibition on peer selling. Academic medical centres in Canada, unlike those in the United States, may rely on the strong guidance of the CMA Code of Ethics prohibition on product endorsement in crafting institutional policies; however, they are not showing leadership in forbidding faculty participation in speakers' bureaus. CME offices are in the process of clarifying and harmonizing policies, but they lack regulatory oversight of physicians' activities outside of accredited CME. The current non-enforcement of the CMA guideline against peer selling in Canada adds new fodder to age-old debates about the merits of self-regulation in medicine. The failure of academic medical institutions and regulatory colleges to enforce the guideline against peer selling and product endorsement bolsters the argument for stronger government oversight of physician-industry interactions.
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